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Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to develop a mathematical anal-
ysis theory to solve differential privacy problems. The heart of our ap-
proaches is to use analytic tools to characterize the correlations among
the outputs of different datasets, which makes it feasible to represent
a differentially private mechanism with minimal number of parameters.
These results are then used to construct differentially private mecha-
nisms analytically. Furthermore, our approaches are universal to almost
all query functions. We believe that the approaches and results of this
paper are indispensable complements to the current studies of differential
privacy that are ruled by the ad hoc and algorithmic approaches.
Keywords: differential privacy, analytic theory, universal mechanism, optimal
mechanism
1 Introduction
Differential privacy [1,2] studies how to query dataset while preserving the pri-
vacy of individuals whose sensitive information is contained in the dataset. The
crux of differential privacy is to find efficient algorithms, called (privacy) mech-
anisms, to query sensitive dataset to obtain relatively accurate outputs while
satisfying differential privacy.
Since the introduction of differential privacy in 2006 [1,2], it has obtained
intensive attentions, both from academic community [3,4,5,6] and from industry
world3 [7]. However, some fundamental problems in differential privacy are still
not solved: “Current approaches are too ad hoc and frequently do not achieve
anything close to the best tradeoffs between accuracy and privacy”, as commented
by Dwork et al.[8]. Specifically, first, there are too many different problems in
differential privacy and each problem has very different mechanisms from others’.
For example, there are the data publishing problems [9,10,11,12], the principal
component analysis problems [13,14,15], the classification problems [16,17] and
the clustering problems [18] among others in differential privacy, and it would
be hard to imagine that the mechanisms of data publishing can be used to solve
3 http://devstreaming.apple.com/videos/wwdc/2016/709tvxadw201avg5v7n/709/
709_engineering_privacy_for_your_users.pdf
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other problems mentioned above. Second, even though there are some mecha-
nisms, such as the sensitivity-based mechanisms [1,19,20] and the exponential
mechanism [21], are universal to deal with many differential privacy problems,
these mechanisms are far less optimal to the tradeoffs between utility and pri-
vacy.
Then, the questions are: whether there exist approaches that are both uni-
versally applicable and (near) optimal to most differential privacy problems? if
there do exist, how can we construct them? These are challenging questions since
the current works in differential privacy don’t give any obvious hint about how
to deal with them. To answer these questions, there are many works to be done.
1.1 Outline and Contribution
This paper mainly do three works to answer the above questions.
First, since the current works in differential privacy are done in a separated
and informal way, a formal and universal illustration to differential privacy prob-
lems is needed to pave the way to study differential privacy rigorously and uni-
versally. We will give an abstract model to mathematically formalize differential
privacy problems in a universal way, which will show that a query function in
differential privacy, in fact, is an operator in functional analysis [22]. These ma-
terials will be presented in Section 3.
Second, we will study the common properties or structures of differential pri-
vacy mechanisms that are applicable to most differential privacy problems. The
complexity of constructing a differential privacy mechanismM is mainly due to
that the outputsM(x), x ∈ D, where eachM(x) is a probability distribution and
D is the universe of datasets, are strongly correlated to each other, which defeats
most attempts to change someM(x)’s to improve utility while letting the results
still satisfy differential privacy. We will introduce analytic tools to characterize
these correlations and then simplify the approaches to construct mechanisms.
Especially, we will discuss what are the minimal amount of parameters that
are needed to represent a differential privacy mechanism. Our approaches, in
principle, are motivated by some approaches in functional analysis [22]. These
problems are discussed in Section 4.
Third, there should be approaches to balance privacy and utility. These ap-
proaches should both be applicable for and (in some extent) optimal to most
differential privacy problems in constructing mechanisms. By using the results
in Section 4 we can make changes to some or all M(x), x ∈ D while letting
the results still satisfy differential privacy, which makes it feasible to construct
mechanisms to balance privacy and utility at will. We will discuss these problems
in Section 5.
In brief, we will develop a mathematical analysis theory to study differential
privacy.
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Table 1: Table of Notation
Notation Description
‖z‖p the `p-norm of the real vector z
N¯ the set of the natural numbers including 0
D, d¯ the set of possible datasets, the metric on the set D, respectively
R, d the set {f(x) : x ∈ D}, the metric on the set R, respectively
P(R) the set of possible probability distributions on R
M(x) a probability distribution in P(R) or a random variable following it
px(r) the probability distribution of the random variable M(x)
qx(r) the discretized probability distribution of px(r)
Rxi the ith layer of the probability distribution px(r) or qx(r)
N xi the set {y ∈ D : i− 1 < d¯(x, y) ≤ i}
Lxq (r) the number of layer of r in the probability distribution q
x(r)
A−B the set difference {x : x ∈ A ∧ x /∈ B}
A− y the set {x− y : x ∈ A}
N
f(x)
δ the δ-neighborhood of f(x), i.e., the set {r ∈ R : d(r, f(x)) ≤ δ}
B the universe of -differential privacy mechanisms of the function f
B¯ the universe of the set sequences of mechanisms in B
C the universe of set sequences of f satisfying (34)
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notations
The notational conventions of this paper are summarized in Table 1. In this
paper, unless noted otherwise, any set is not a multiset. Set  > 0.
2.2 Differential Privacy
A dataset is a collection (a multiset) of n records, each of which is derived from
the record universe X and denotes the information of one individual. We use
the histogram representation x ∈ N¯|X | to denote the dataset x, where the ith
entry xi of x represents the number of elements in x of type i ∈ X [23,3,24]. Two
datasets x, x′ are said to be neighbors (or neighboring datasets) if ‖x−x′‖1 = 1.
Differential privacy [2,3] characterizes privacy by capturing the changes of
outputs when one’s record in the queried dataset is changed. The changes of
datasets are modeled by the notion of the neighboring datasets. For the dataset
universe D and a query function f , let R ⊇ {f(x) : x ∈ D} and equip R with a
Borel σ-algebra B [25].
Definition 1 (-Differential Privacy). For the dataset universe D, let P(R)
denote the set of all the probability measures on (R,B). A mapping M : D →
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P(R) gives -differential privacy if for any two neighbors x, x′ ∈ D, and any
S ∈ B, there is
Pr[M(x) ∈ S] ≤ exp() Pr[M(x′) ∈ S], (1)
where we abuse the notation M(x) as either denoting a probability distribution
in P(R) or denoting a random variable following the probability distribution.
2.3 Achieving Differential Privacy
The global sensitivity-based method is a basic approach to achieve differential
privacy [1]. We first define the global sensitivity.
Definition 2 (Global Sensitivity). For the query function f : D → R, if
R ⊆ Rk, then the global sensitivity of f is defined as
∆f = max
x,x′∈D:‖x−x′‖1=1
‖f(x)− f(x′)‖1.
Furthermore, letting sx : R → (−∞, 0] be the score function when the inputted
dataset is x, the global sensitivity of sx is defined as
∆s = max
r∈R,x,x′∈D:‖x−x′‖1=1
|sx(r)− sx′(r)|.
The Laplace mechanism [2,3] is one important global sensitivity-based mech-
anism and the Exponential mechanism [21] is one generalization of the global
sensitivity-based mechanisms.
Definition 3. The Laplace mechanism M(x) generates a real random vector
r = (r1, . . . , rk) with probability distribution
px(r) =

2∆f
exp
(
−‖r − f(x)‖1
∆f
)
.
The Exponential mechanism M(x) outputs an element r ∈ R with probability
distribution
px(r) =
1
αx
exp
(
sx(r)
2∆s
)
, (2)
where αx is the normalizor.
Both the Laplace mechanism and the Exponential mechanism satisfy -differential
privacy [3].
2.4 A Lemma to Mediant Inequalities
Lemma 1. Let g(x) = α0+α1xβ0+β1x , x ∈ R, where αi ≥ 0, βi > 0 for i ∈ {0, 1}. If
α0
β0
< α1β1 , then g(x) is increasing. Otherwise, if
α0
β0
≥ α1β1 , then g(x) is decreasing.
Proof. Note that the derivative of g(x) is g′(x) = α1β0−α0β1(β0x+β1)2 , by which the claims
are immediate. uunionsq
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3 Abstract Model of Differential Privacy
In this section we present an abstract model to differential privacy, of which
the intentions are to formalize differential privacy problems in a universal and
formal way, and to pave the way to discuss the common properties of differential
privacy problems. There are somewhat similar treatments in [26,27].
We will model each differential privacy problem as a problem of a query
function f : D → R, of which the domain D is the set of possible datasets on
which a metric is defined, and of which R ⊇ {f(x) : x ∈ D} on which another
one metric is defined. That is, a query function in differential privacy, in general,
is an operator in functional analysis [22]. For the simplicity of presentation, in
the following parts of this paper, we set R = {f(x) : x ∈ D}.
3.1 Dataset Metric Space and Value Metric Space
The dataset universe is modeled as a set D on which a metric d¯ is defined.4
Definition 4 (Dataset Metric Space). Let f be a function defined on the
set D on which a metric d¯ is defined. Then the metric space (D, d¯) is called the
dataset metric space of f . Two elements x, y ∈ D are said to be neighbors (or
neighboring datasets) of distance k if k − 1 < d¯(x, y) ≤ k, for k ∈ N¯. When
k = 1, x, y are said to be neighbors (or neighboring datasets).
Set N xi = {y ∈ D : i − 1 < d¯(x, y) ≤ i}, for i ∈ N¯. Set N¯ xi = {y ∈ D :
d¯(x, y) ≤ i} for i ∈ N¯ and set N x = {y ∈ D : d¯(x, y) ≤ 1} for abbreviation.
The codomain of the query function f on D is modeled as a set R on which
a metric d is defined.
Definition 5 (Value Metric Space). For a function f on D, set R = {f(x) :
x ∈ D}. Defining a metric d on R, then (R, d) is called the value metric space
of f . Equipping R with the Borel σ-algebra B generated by the open sets in R
(in the metric topology), then (R,B) is a measurable space [25].
The product metric space and the product probability space are used to
model the batch query functions.
Definition 6 (Product Metric Space). If (R1, d1), . . . , (Rn, dn) are metric
spaces, and N is a norm on Rn, then
(R1×· · ·×Rn, N(d1, . . . , dn)) is a metric
space, where the product metric N(d1, ..., dn) is defined by
N(d1, ..., dn)
(
(x1, . . . , xn), (y1, . . . , yn)
)
= N
(
d1(x1, y1), . . . , dn(xn, yn)
)
,
and the induced topology agrees with the product topology.
Definition 7 (Product Probability Space). Let (R1,B1, µ1), . . . , (Rn,Bn, µn)
be n probability spaces. Then the probability space (R,B, µ), defined by R =
R1 × · · ·×Rn, B = B1 × · · · × Bn and µ = µ1 × · · · × µn, is called the product
probability space of the n probability spaces.
4 The definitions of the metric and the metric space follow the references [28,22].
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For n query functions f1, . . . , fn over the dataset metric space (D, d¯), let
(R1, d1), . . . , (Rn, dn) be their value metric spaces, respectively. Then the prod-
uct metric space
(R1 × · · · × Rn, N(d1, . . . , dn)) is called the (product) value
metric space of f1, . . . , fn.
3.2 Definition of Differential Privacy
For the query function f : D → R, let (D, d¯), (R, d) be its dataset metric space
and value metric space, respectively. Let (R,B) be a measurable space.
Definition 8 (-Differential Privacy). Let P(R) denote the set of all the
probability distributions on (R,B). A mappingM : D → P(R) gives -differential
privacy if, for any two neighbors x, x′ ∈ D and any S ∈ B, there is
Pr[M(x) ∈ S] ≤ exp() Pr[M(x′) ∈ S]. (3)
For the random variableM(x), let px(r) be its probability distribution. Then
the mechanism M can be represented by the set {px(r) : x ∈ D}.
Proposition 1 (Composition Privacy). For the dataset metric space (D, d¯),
letMi be i-differentially private on (Ri,Bi) for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then the compo-
sition ofM1, . . . ,Mn, defined byM(x) = (M1(x), . . . ,Mn(x)), x ∈ D, satisfies∑n
i=1 i-differential privacy on the product probability space (R,B).
Proof. The proof is similar with the one of Theorem 3.14 in [3] and is omitted.
uunionsq
Proposition 2 (Group Privacy). Let M be an -differentially private mech-
anism. Assume that, for any x, y ∈ D with d¯(x, y) = i for i ∈ N, there exists
x′ ∈ D such that d¯(x, x′) = 1 and d¯(x′, y) = i− 1. Then
Pr[M(x) ∈ S] ≤ exp(i) Pr[M(y) ∈ S],
for any S ∈ B.
Proof. The proposition is an immediate corollary of the inequality (3). uunionsq
3.3 Utility and Optimal Mechanism Problem
Let (R, d) be the value metric space of f . We use the expected distortion P x
between the random variableM(x) and f(x) to measure the utility of the mech-
anism M at the dataset x, i.e.,
P x = Ep[d(M(x), f(x))] =
∫
r∈R
d(r, f(x))px(dr), (4)
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where px(r) is the probability distribution ofM(x). We use the set {P x : x ∈ D}
to measure the utility of M. An alternative to measure the utility of M is to
use the expected value of P x, i.e.,
P = EP x =
∫
x∈D
P xp(dx) =
∫
x∈D
∫
r∈R
d(r, f(x))px(dr)p(dx), (5)
where p(x) is the occurring probability distribution of datasts in D.
Let the set
B = {{px(r) : x ∈ D} : {px(r) : x ∈ D} satisfies -differential privacy} (6)
denote the universe of -differential privacy mechanisms of the query function f .
Then, the Pareto optimal mechanism problem of the query function f would be
the multi-objective optimization problem [29]
min
{px(r):x∈D}∈B
{P x : x ∈ D}. (7)
Similarly, the expected optimal mechanism problem of the query function f would
be the optimization problem
min
{px(r):x∈D}∈B
P. (8)
3.4 Query Function
Notice that the definition of a query function in above sections is consistent with
the definition of an operator in functional analysis [22]. Therefore, following the
tradition of functional analysis, a query function f : D → R is also called an
operator f : D → R.
The linear function is known to be one kind of the simplest query functions in
differential privacy, which is a generalization of the sum function or the counting
function [3].
Definition 9 (Linear Function). For the query function f : D → R, assume
both of D,R are vector spaces over the same field [22]. If f(x+y) = f(x) +f(y)
for all x, y ∈ D, the function f is said to be a linear (query) function or a linear
operator [22].
Note that, for a linear function f , the set
Vf :={f(x′)− f(x) : x′ ∈ N x}
={f(x′ − x) : x′ ∈ N x}
={f(y) : d¯(0, y) ≤ 1}
has no difference for different x and seems to be different from those of other
linear queries. Therefore, we can use Vf to represent f . We call Vf the neighboring
set of the linear function f . Any query function, which is not a linear function,
is said to be a non-linear (query) function.
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Definition 10 (Monotonic Function). The function f is said to be a mono-
tonic (query) function if for any x ∈ D and all y, z ∈ D such that d¯(x, y) >
d¯(x, z), there is d(f(x), f(y)) ≥ d(f(x), f(z)), and to be a strictly monotonic
(query) function if d(f(x), f(y)) > d(f(x), f(z)).
The identity function is used to model the data publication problem in dif-
ferential privacy [11,12].
Definition 11 (Permutation Function and Identity Function). The in-
jective function f : D → R is called a permutation function if D = R. Moreover,
if f(x) = x for all x ∈ D, then f is called an identity function.
Definition 12 (Global Sensitivity and Local Sensitivity). Let (D, d¯), (R, d)
be the dataset metric space, the value metric space of the function f , respectively.
The global sensitivity of f is defined as
∆f = max
x,x′∈D:d¯(x′,x)≤1
d(f(x), f(x′)).
The local sensitivity of f at x is defined as
∆xf = max
x′∈D:d¯(x′,x)≤1
d(f(x), f(x′)).
Note that the definitions of the global sensitivity and the local sensitivity are
consistent with those in [1,19,20].
3.5 Instance Interpretation
The abstract model in Section 3 is consistent with the classic differential privacy
model. To see this, we give some instance interpretations.
First, for a query function, the set D in the dataset metric space (D, d¯)
is equivalent to the dataset universe in the classic differential privacy model.
The metric d¯ captures the mathematical meaning of the neighboring relation of
datasets. The details are as follows. There are two different definitions about
neighboring datasets in differential privacy: bounded neighboring datasets and
unbounded neighboring datasets [30]. For the definition of bounded neighboring
datasets, all of the datasets are assumed to have the same number n of records.
Two datasets x, x′ ∈ D are said to be neighboring datasets if ‖x − x′‖1 = 2,
where x, x′ are their histogram representations as noted in Section 2.2. In this
case, we can set d¯(x, y) = ‖x−y‖12 . For the definition of unbounded neighboring
datasets, the number of records in a dataset can be any natural number. Two
datasets x, x′ ∈ D are said to be neighboring datasets if ‖x − x′‖1 = 1. In this
case, we can set d¯(x, y) = ‖x− y‖1.
Theoretically, in differential privacy, almost all of data processing problems
can be explained as a function f whose domain is set to be D and whose
codomain is set to be R, such as the SQL query problems [31,32,33,34], the
statistical problems [35,36,37], and the data ming or machine learning problems
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[38,10,39,40,41,16,14,17,42]. The idea of differential privacy to preserve privacy
can be explained as follows: When the real dataset is x, in order to preserve pri-
vacy, a differentially private mechanism first samples a dataset y ∈ D (according
to a probability distribution) and then outputs f(y) as the final query result of
f . There should be a distortion function Dx(r) to measure the distortion when
querying the dataset x but obtaining f(y). Then, the metric d of the value metric
space (R, d) can be set as
d(f(x), r) = Dx(r), x ∈ D, r ∈ R, (9)
which is a measure of the distortion of querying the dataset x but obtaining r.
For example, if R ⊆ Rk, we can set d(f(x), r) = ‖f(x) − r‖p[23,24]; if R is a
set of real matrices, we can use a norm over matrices to define d [13,14,15]. For
the case of R being a set of non-numeric elements, the corresponding distortion
function Dx(r), in general, will not satisfy the triangular inequality property
and the symmetric property of metric [28], such as those in [10,11,12]. In this
condition, the metric d can be considered as an approximation of Dx(r) and
we would treat the real problem by the method found when treating the ideal
problem, which would simplify the complexity of complex problems. We now
give some examples.
Example 1 (counting query). A counting query function f outputs non-negative
integers. Then, we can set R = {0, . . . , k}, and d(r, f(x)) = |r − f(x)|. The
subgraph counting query [43,32,44,31] is a special kind of counting queries.
Example 2 (multi-linear queries [23,3,24,45]). For k real valued linear queries
f1, . . . , fk, we can set f(x) = (f1(x), . . . , fk(x)) for all x ∈ D. Then R can be set
as a subset of Rk and d(r, f(x)) = ‖r − f(x)‖p.
Example 3 (data publishing and synthetic dataset generation). For the data pub-
lishing problem [10,11,12,46,9,47,48], the query function can be defined as the
identity function as defined in Definition 11 where the codomain R of f is the
same as its domain D. There will be different ways to set the metric d, in which
the simplest way is to set d = d¯, i.e., the metric induced by the `1-norm. The
synthetic dataset generation problem [49,50,51,52] is a special case of the data
publishing problem where the metric d is the induced metric of the `2-norm of
the linear queries’ output vector.
Example 4 (principal component analysis [13,14,15,38,53]). For the principal
component analysis problem, each record is a real-valued vector and a dataset
x is an n × m real-valued matrix. The value f(x) is the principal component
analysis matrix of x, i.e., a k ×m real-valued matrix. Then R is a set of k ×m
real-valued matrices. The metric d(f(x), r) can be set as the spectral norm or
the frobenius norm of the matrix r − f(x).
Example 5 (linear classifier [16,54,17]). For the linear classifier problem, the
value f(x) can be set as the classifier of the dataset x (if there are several candi-
dates, just choose one randomly), i.e., a k dimensional real-valued vector, which
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is the output of a classifier algorithm, such as the logistic regression algorithm.
ThenR is a set of k dimensional real-valued vectors and d(r, f(x)) = ‖r−f(x)‖p.
Example 6 (functional output [55,16,56]). As noted in [55], there are many ap-
plications, in which the outputs are functions, such as the density functions. In
this case, the value of f(x) would be a function and the codomain R would be
a set of functions. Let (F , ‖ · ‖) be a normed space [22] and let R ⊆ F , then
d(r, f(x)) = ‖r − f(x)‖.
4 Representation Theory to Mechanisms
The main obstacle to solve the optimal mechanism problems (7) and (8) is that
we are almost unknown to the set B, the universe of the -differential privacy
mechanisms of the query function f . The set B is complex since, for each mecha-
nism {px(r), x ∈ D} ∈ B, the probability distributions px(r), x ∈ D are strongly
correlated to each other. In this section, we first study the correlations among
the probability distributions px(r), x ∈ D, and then study the representation
of mechanisms and the structure of the set B. Our study is motivated by some
approaches to study the representation of elements in Hilbert space, where each
element in a Hilbert space can be uniquely represented by the Fourier coefficients
through a orthonormal basis [22, Chapter 3]. Note that we don’t mean that the
set B has similar structure with Hilbert spaces. In fact, they are very different.
Let f : D → R be any one query function as defined in Section 3. For the
clarity of presentation, in the following parts of this paper, we assume that both
D and R are discrete. In this setting, for any A ⊆ R, we set ∫
A
dr = |A|. Other
cases can be treated similarly.
4.1 Discretization of Mechanism
The discretization of mechanism is our first step to characterize the correla-
tions among px(r), x ∈ D. Our idea is to substitute the study of the discretized
mechanism for the study of its original mechanisms.
Definition 13 (Discretization of Mechanism). For the mechanism {px(r) :
x ∈ D}, let M = maxr∈R,x∈D px(r). For each x ∈ D, set
Rxi =
{
r ∈ R : exp(−(i+ 1)) < p
x(r)
M
≤ exp(−i)
}
, i ∈ N¯. (10)
Then the mechanism {qx(r) : x ∈ D} is said to be the discretization (or dis-
cretized mechanism) of {px(r) : x ∈ D} if
qx(r) =
exp(−i)
αx
, for all r ∈ Rxi , (11)
where αx =
∑∞
i=0 exp(−i) |Rxi | is the normalizer.
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We now show that the discretized mechanism {qx(r) : x ∈ D} has similar
privacy level and utility level with its original mechanism {px(r) : x ∈ D}.
Theorem 1. Let {px(r) : x ∈ D} and {qx(r) : x ∈ D} be as shown in Definition
13. If {px(r) : x ∈ D} is -differentially private, then {qx(r) : x ∈ D} at least
satisfies 2-differential privacy. Furthermore, letting Epd(f(x), r),Eqd(f(x), r)
denote the utility of {px(r) : x ∈ D} and {qx(r) : x ∈ D} at the dataset x,
respectively, as shown in (4), then we have
exp(−)Eqd(f(x), r) ≤ Epd(f(x), r) ≤ exp()Eqd(f(x), r). (12)
Proof. We first prove the claim about privacy. Let {px(r) : x ∈ D} be -
differentially private and let x, x′ ∈ D be two neighbors. For any r ∈ R, assume
qx(r) = exp(−i)αx and q
x′(r) = exp(−j)
αx′
. We have
px(r)
M
/
px
′
(r)
M
=
px(r)
px′(r)
≤ exp(), (13)
which ensures |i− j| ≤ 1 by the equality (10). Then
qx(r)
qx′(r)
=
exp(−i)
exp(−j)/
αx
′
αx
< exp(2) (14)
for any r ∈ R, which ensures the 2-differential privacy of {qx(r) : x ∈ D}.
Now, we prove the claim about utility. By (4), we have
Epd(f(x), r) =
∑
r∈R
px(r)d(f(x), r) (15)
=
∞∑
i=0
∑
r∈Rxi
px(r)d(f(x), r) (16)
=
∞∑
i=0
∑
r∈Rxi
px(r)∑
r∈R px(r)
d(f(x), r) (17)
≤
∞∑
i=0
∑
r∈Rxi
exp(−i)M∑∞
i=0
∑
r∈Rxi exp(−(i+ 1))M
d(f(x), r) (18)
= exp()
∞∑
i=0
∑
r∈Rxi
exp(−i)∑∞
i=0 |Rxi | exp(−i)
d(f(x), r) (19)
= exp()Eqd(f(x), r). (20)
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Similarly, we have
Epd(f(x), r) =
∞∑
i=0
∑
r∈Rxi
px(r)∑
r∈R px(r)
d(f(x), r) (21)
≥
∞∑
i=0
∑
r∈Rxi
exp(−(i+ 1))M∑∞
i=0
∑
r∈Rxi exp(−i)M
d(f(x), r) (22)
= exp(−)
∞∑
i=0
∑
r∈Rxi
exp(−i)∑∞
i=0 |Rxi | exp(−i)
d(f(x), r) (23)
= exp(−)Eqd(f(x), r). (24)
The claims are proved. uunionsq
Theorem 1 implies that we can approximately substitute the study of the
discretized mechanism for the study of its original mechanism with less deviation
from both utility and privacy.
Definition 14 (Equivalence of Mechanisms I). Let {px(r) : x ∈ D} and Rxi
be as shown in Definition 13. Then {Rxi : i ∈ N¯, x ∈ D} is called the set sequences
of the mechanism {px(r) : x ∈ D}, and the set Rxi is called the ith layer of the
probability distribution px(r). Two mechanisms are said to be equivalent if they
share the same set sequences. Furthermore, if a point r ∈ R is in the ith layer
of the probability distribution px(r), we denote Lxp(r) = i.
Note that the set sequences {Rxi : i ∈ N¯, x ∈ D} contains all the information
to construct the mechanism {qx(r) : x ∈ D}. Therefore, we can use the former
to denote the later or to denote the equivalent mechanism {px(r) : x ∈ D} when
there is no ambiguity.
4.2 Representation of Mechanisms
We now discuss the properties of the set sequences, which accurately capture
the correlations among px(r), x ∈ D.
Theorem 2. Let {px(r) : x ∈ D} and {Rxi : i ∈ N¯, x ∈ D} be as shown in
Definition 13. Set Axi = ∪ij=0Rxj for each x ∈ D and each i ∈ N¯. If {px(r) : x ∈
D} satisfies -differential privacy, then
1. for any two neighbors x, x′ ∈ D, there is Rxi ∩Rx
′
j 6= ∅ only if |i− j| ≤ 1;
2. there is
Rxi ⊇ ∪x′∈D:0<d¯(x,x′)≤1Rx
′
i−1 −Axi−1 (25)
for each x ∈ D and each i ∈ N;
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3. there is
Axi ⊇ ∪y∈D:d¯(x,y)≤iRy0 (26)
for each x ∈ D and each i ∈ N¯;
4. there is
Rxi ⊇ ∪y∈D:i−1<d¯(x,y)≤iRy0 −Axi−1 (27)
for each x ∈ D and each i ∈ N.
Proof. We prove the first claim by contradiction. Assume that there exists r0 ∈ R
such that r0 ∈ Rxi ∩Rx
′
i+2. Then
px(r0)/M
px′ (r0)/M
= p
x(r0)
px′ (r0)
> exp(), which is contrary
to the -differential privacy of {px(r) : x ∈ D}. Other cases can be treated
similarly. Therefore, the first claim is correct.
Now we prove the second claim. By the first claim, there is Ax1 ⊇ Rx
′
0 for
each neighbor x′ of x, which ensures
Rx1 ⊇ ∪x′∈D:0<d¯(x,x′)≤1Rx
′
0 −Ax0 . (28)
When i ≥ 2, by the first claim, there are (Rxi−1 ∪Rxi ∪Rxi+1) ⊇ Rx′i for each
neighbor x′ of x. Therefore, we have
Rxi+1 ⊇ ∪x′∈D:0<d¯(x,x′)≤1Rx
′
i −Axi . (29)
The second claim is proved.
We prove the third claim by induction. First, it is easy to verify that the
equation (26) is correct when i = 0. Second, assume the equation (26) holds for
any x ∈ D when i ≤ k, where k ∈ N¯. We have
Axk+1 ⊇a
(
∪x′∈D:0<d¯(x,x′)≤1Ax
′
k
)
⊇b
(
∪x′∈D:0<d¯(x,x′)≤1
(
∪y∈D:d¯(x′,y)≤kRy0
))
⊇c
(
∪y∈D:d¯(x,y)≤k+1Ry0
)
,
where ⊇a is due to the first claim and the definition of Axi , ⊇b is due to the
assumption, and ⊇c is due to the triangular inequality property of the metric d¯.
The third claim is proved.
Now we prove the forth claim. Since Axi = ∪ij=0Rxj = Rxi ∪ Axi−1, we have
Rxi ⊇Axi −Axi−1 (30)
⊇ ∪y∈D:d(x,y)≤i Ry0 −Axi−1 ⊇ ∪y∈D:i−1<d(x,y)≤iRy0 −Axi−1. (31)
The forth claim is proved.
The proof is complete. uunionsq
Theorem 2 shows some important properties of differentially private mech-
anisms, which characterize the correlations among M(x), x ∈ D well. These
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properties, especially the fourth one, are the basis of this paper to analyze dif-
ferential privacy. We are more interested in one special case of (27), where, for
each x ∈ D and each i ∈ N, there is
Rxi = ∪y∈D:i−1<d(x,y)≤iRy0 −Axi−1, (32)
which gives the boundary condition required to satisfy differential privacy. This
special case indicates an interesting phenomenon: the corresponding mechanism
{Rxi : i ∈ N¯, x ∈ D} is determined only by the initial values {Rx0 : x ∈ D}
through the construction rule (32). This phenomenon motivates us to explore
whether any one mechanism has the similar concise representation.
In order to achieve the aim, we need to rewrite the construction rule (27),
which is shown as follows. For the mechanism {Rxi : i ∈ N¯, x ∈ D}, set
R˜xi = Rxi −
(
∪y∈D:i−1<d¯(x,y)≤iRy0 −Axi−1
)
(33)
for each i ∈ N and each x ∈ D. Assume there exists a set Ix = {ix0 , ix1 , . . . , ixtx} ⊆
N (tx may be ∞) such that R˜xi 6= ∅ for each i ∈ Ix = {ix0 , ix1 , . . . , ixtx}, and that
R˜xi = ∅ for any i /∈ Ix. Then, we have
Rxi = R˜xi ∪
(
∪y∈D:i−1<d¯(x,y)≤iRy0 −Axi−1
)
(34)
for each i ∈ N and each x ∈ D. Denote RxIx = {R˜xix0 , . . . , R˜xixtx}. Then the
mechanism {Rxi : i ∈ N¯, x ∈ D} is uniquely determined by the initial values
{Rx0 ,RxIx : x ∈ D} and the construction rule (34). In this manner, the equation
(32) can be considered as a special case of the equation (34) where RxIx = ∅ for
all x ∈ D. We then have the follow representation theorem of mechanisms.
Theorem 3 (Representation of Mechanism). Let {px(r) : x ∈ D} and
{Rxi : i ∈ N¯, x ∈ D} be as shown in Definition 13. If {px(r) : x ∈ D} satisfies
-differential privacy, then {Rxi : i ∈ N¯, x ∈ D} is uniquely determined by the
initial values {Rx0 ,RxIx : x ∈ D} throngh the construction rule (34).
The equation (34) accurately captures the correlations among the probability
distributions px(r), x ∈ D. One very important thing is that Theorem 3 shows a
way to represent and study mechanisms universally. That is, in order to figure
out differential privacy, we only need to study the principles of setting the initial
values {Rx0 ,RxIx : x ∈ D}. Then Definition 14 can be rewritten as follow.
Definition 15 (Equivalence of Mechanisms II). Two -differential privacy
mechanisms are said to be equivalent if they share the same initial values {Rx0 ,RxIx :
x ∈ D}.
Furthermore, for an -differential privacy mechanism, if its RxIx = ∅ for all
x ∈ D, it is called a basic mechanism. Otherwise, it is called a general mecha-
nism.
Noticing that the initial values {Rx0 ,RxIx : x ∈ D} can uniquely determine
the mechanism {Rxi : i ∈ N¯, x ∈ D}, we will use these initial values to denote
the mechanism in the following sections where necessary.
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Proposition 3. For the mechanism {Rxi : i ∈ N¯, x ∈ D}, if it can be recon-
structed by the initial values {Rx0 ,RxIx : x ∈ D} through the construction rule
(34), then it at least satisfies 2-differential privacy.
For the basic mechanisms, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Let {px(r) : x ∈ D} and {Rxi : i ∈ N¯, x ∈ D} be as shown in
Definition 13. If {px(r) : x ∈ D} is a basic mechanism and satisfies -differential
privacy, then
1. for any two neighbors x, x′ ∈ D, Rxi ∩Rx
′
j 6= ∅ only if |i− j| ≤ 1;
2. there is
Rxi = ∪x′∈D:0<d¯(x,x′)≤1Rx
′
i−1 −Axi−1 (35)
for each x ∈ D and each i ∈ N;
3. there is
Axi = ∪y∈D:d¯(x,y)≤iRy0 (36)
for each x ∈ D and each i ∈ N¯;
4. there is
Rxi = ∪y∈D:i−1<d¯(x,y)≤iRy0 −Axi−1 (37)
for each x ∈ D and each i ∈ N.
4.3 Representation of Optimal Mechanism Problems
For the function f , let
B¯ =
{{Rxi : i ∈ N¯, x ∈ D} : {Rxi : i ∈ N¯, x ∈ D} is the discretization of a mechanism in B}
:=a
{{Rx0 ,RxIx : x ∈ D} : {Rx0 ,RxIx : x ∈ D} is the initial values of a mechanism in B¯}
(38)
denote the universe of the discretized mechanisms of the mechanisms in B, where
the equality =a is due to Theorem 3. Then, the set B¯ would be an approximation
of the set B and shows a beautiful structure of B. By Theorem 1 and Theorem 3,
the Pareto optimal mechanism problem (7) can be approximated by the Pareto
optimal mechanism problem
min
{Rx0 ,RxIx :x∈D}∈B¯
{P¯ x : x ∈ D}, (39)
where
P¯ x = Eqd(f(x), r) =
∑∞
i=0 exp(−i)
∑
r∈Rxi d(f(x), r)∑∞
i=0 exp(−i) |Rxi |
. (40)
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Furthermore, let the set
C =
{{Rxi : i ∈ N¯, x ∈ D} : {Rxi : i ∈ N¯, x ∈ D} satisfies (34)}
:={{Rx0 ,RxIx : x ∈ D} : {Rx0 ,RxIx : x ∈ D} is the initial values of a set sequences in C}
(41)
denote the universe of the set sequences {Rxi : i ∈ N¯, x ∈ D} satisfying (34),
where
R˜xi ∩
(
∪y∈D:i−1<d¯(x,y)≤iRy0 −Axi−1
)
= ∅. (42)
Then, there is C ⊇ B¯. Unfortunately, we are unknown whether there is C = B¯.
Nevertheless, C is a good approximation of B¯ by Proposition 3 and therefore the
optimization problem (7) can be approximated by the optimization problem
min
{Rx0 ,RxIx :x∈D}∈C
{P¯ x : x ∈ D}. (43)
Clearly, the problem (43) is much more operational than the problem (7) since
the set C is known.
Similarly, the optimal mechanism problem (8) can be approximated by the
optimization problem
min
{Rx0 ,RxIx :x∈D}∈C
P¯ , (44)
where
P¯ = EP¯ x =
∑
x∈D
p(x)
∑∞
i=0 exp(−i)
∑
r∈Rxi d(f(x), r)∑∞
i=0 exp(−i) |Rxi |
. (45)
5 Analytic Construction of Mechanisms
The above section shows that, for the query function f : D → R, each mechanism
and then the utilities are completely determined by the parameters {Rx0 ,RxIx :
x ∈ D}, and that the optimal mechanisms can be approximately evaluated
through evaluating (43) and (44). Now we discuss the changing rules of utilities
when tuning these parameters within the set C. Another work of this section is
to classify the mechanisms according to different settings of these parameters.
5.1 The Basic Mechanisms
In this section, we consider the basic mechanisms, i.e., the setting RxIx = ∅ for
all x ∈ D by Definition 15. Notice that, by the construction of the set sequences
{Rxi }x,i in Definition 13, the set Rx0 contains those points with the highest
outputting probabilities. Therefore, in order to obtain better utility, at least the
point f(x) should be included in that set, i.e., there should be f(x) ∈ Rx0 for
each x ∈ D. We are more interested in the case where {f(x)} = Rx0 for all x ∈ D,
which may be the simplest mechanism since the probability distribution qx(r) is
completely determined only by a point f(x).
Analytic Theory to Differential Privacy 17
Definition 16 (Purest Mechanism). If Rx0 = {f(x)} and RxIx = ∅ for all
x ∈ D, then the mechanism {Rx0 ,RxIx : x ∈ D} is called the purest mechanism
for the query function f : D → R.
The purest mechanism has the following interesting property.
Proposition 4. For the purest mechanism {Rxi : i ∈ N¯, x ∈ D}, there are
Rxi = {f(y) : i− 1 < d¯(x, y) ≤ i} − {f(y) : d¯(x, y) ≤ i− 1} (46)
for i ∈ N. Especially, if f is a strictly monotonic function, then there are Rxi =
{f(y) : i− 1 < d¯(x, y) ≤ i} for i ∈ N.
Proof. The first claim is an immediate corollary of Corollary 1. The second claim
holds since there is
{f(y) : i− 1 < d¯(x, y) ≤ i} ∩ {f(y) : d¯(x, y) ≤ i− 1} = ∅ (47)
if f is strictly monotonic by Definition 10. uunionsq
Proposition 4 shows a very interesting phenomenon: To the dataset x, the
ith layer Rxi of the probability distribution qx(r) is (approximately, i.e., if the
equation (47) holds) the set of values of f over N xi , where N xi is just the set of
datasets y whose distances to x satisfy i− 1 < d¯(x, y) ≤ i. This phenomenon is
especially useful to understand the structure of differential privacy displayed in
Theorem 2, Theorem 3 and Corollary 1. It can be considered as a microcosm of
the structure.
The following definition, the atomic mechanism, presents a generalization to
the purest mechnism. It is atomic since it can’t be split into more slim mecha-
nisms but, on the other hand, can be used to generate other mechanisms.
Definition 17 (Atomic Mechanism). If each initial value set Rx0 only con-
tains one point in R for all x ∈ D, then the basic mechanism {Rx0 : x ∈ D} is
called an atomic mechanism.
We now discuss how to derive other basic mechanisms from the purest mecha-
nism or the atomic mechanisms. Note that the we only need to change the initial
values {Rx0 : x ∈ D} of the atomic mechanisms or the purest mechanism. A nat-
ural way is to set Rx0 to be a δ-neighborhood Nf(x)δ := {r ∈ R : d(f(x), r) ≤ δ}
of f(x) but not be the singleton set {f(x)}, where δ is a small positive number.
The reason of the above setting is obvious: Those points r being near to f(x)
respect to metric d should obtain higher outputting probabilities in order to
obtain better utility by (40).
Definition 18 (δ-neighborhood mechanism). If Rx0 = Nf(x)δx and RxIx = ∅
for all x ∈ D, then the mechanism {Rxi : i ∈ N¯, x ∈ D} is called a δ-neighborhood
mechanism of the query function f : D → R.
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Notice that each dataset x may have different radius δx to its neighborhood
N
f(x)
δx . One misconception is that the more larger of δ
x the more better utility
of the δ-neighborhood mechanism. This is totally wrong since when one x’s δx
becomes larger, the utility of other datasets, in general, becomes worse since
those points in Rx0 , in general, are all included in the ith layer of the dataset y
if d¯(x, y) = i by Corollary 1. Therefore, there should be a balance among the
radii δx’s of the datasets.
We now discuss the changing rules of the set sequences when one dataset’s
initial values changes. For example, for the purest mechanism {Rx0 : x ∈ D} and
the mechanism {R¯x0 : x ∈ D} such that R¯x00 = {f(x0), r0} and R¯x0 = Rx0 =
{f(x)} for all x ∈ D \ {x0}, we may want to known the relation between the
two mechanisms’ set sequences. We have the following lemma for the purest
mechanism.
Lemma 2. For the query function f , let x0, y0 be two datasets such that f(x0) 6=
r0 where r0 = f(y0). Let {qx(r) : x ∈ D} be the purest mechanism of f and let
{Rxi : i ∈ N¯, x ∈ D} be its set sequences. Let {q¯x(r) : x ∈ D} be one basic
mechanism of f and let {R¯xi : i ∈ N¯, x ∈ D} be its set sequences such that
R¯x00 = {f(x0), r0} and R¯x0 = {f(x)} for all x ∈ D \ {x0}. Let y be any one
dataset such that r 6= r0, where r = f(y). Then, for any dataset x ∈ D, there
are Lxq¯ (r) = L
x
q (r) and L
x
q¯ (r0) = min
{dd¯(x0, x)e, Lxq (r0)}.
Proof. We first prove the equality Lxq¯ (r) = L
x
q (r). Recall that, by Corollary 1,
there are
Rxi = ∪y∈D:i−1<d¯(x,y)≤iRy0 − ∪y∈D:d¯(x,y)≤i−1Ry0 (48)
and
R¯xi = ∪y∈D:i−1<d¯(x,y)≤iR¯y0 − ∪y∈D:d¯(x,y)≤i−1R¯y0 (49)
for each x ∈ D and each i ∈ N. Then, by combining the settings of Rx0 and R¯x0 , if
r ∈ Rxi and r 6= r0, we have r ∈ R¯xi , which ensures the equality Lxq¯ (r) = Lxq (r).
Now we prove the equality Lxq¯ (r0) = min
{dd¯(x0, x)e, Lxq (r0)}. Denote i0 =
dd¯(x0, x)e, j0 = dd¯(y0, x)e and k0 = Lxq (r0). By (49), there are totally three
possible layers of q¯x(r) in which the point r0 can be: the i0th, the j0th or the
k0th layer of q¯
x(r). Note that there is k0 ≤ j0 by the equality (48), which
implies that r0 can’t be in the j0th layer. Then there leave two possible cases:
i0 ≤ k0 and i0 > k0. First, assume i0 ≤ k0. Then the point r0 must be in
the i0th layer of q¯
x(r) by the equality (49). Next, assume i0 > k0. Then the
point r0 must be in the k0th layer of q¯
x(r) by the equality (49). In all, there is
Lxq¯ (r0) = min{dd¯(x0, x)e, Lxq (r0)}.
The proof is complete. uunionsq
Applying the proof techniques of Lemma 2 to other basic mechanisms, we
have the following theorem.
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Theorem 4. For the query function f , let x0, y0 be two datasets such that
f(x0) 6= r0 where r0 = f(y0). Let {qx(r) : x ∈ D}, {q¯x(r) : x ∈ D} be two
basic mechanisms of f and let {Rxi : i ∈ N¯, x ∈ D}, {R¯xi : i ∈ N¯, x ∈ D} be
their set sequences, respectively. Assume Rx0 = R¯x0 for all x ∈ D \ {x0}. Assume
R¯x00 = Rx00 ∪{r0}, where r0 /∈ Rx00 . Let y be one dataset such that r 6= r0, where
r = f(y). Then there are Lxq¯ (r) = L
x
q (r) and L
x
q¯ (r0) = min
{dd¯(x0, x)e, Lxq (r0)}.
The results of Lemma 2 and Theorem 4 show that, if r 6= r0, then the layer
of r in q¯x(r) is equal to its layer in qx(r). They also show that the layer of the
point r0 is always ascending in each probability distribution q¯
x(r) compared to
its layer in qx(r). Now we may wonder what is the effect of the layer ascending
of r0 to the utilities {P x : x ∈ D}. The following theorem gives the question an
answer.
Theorem 5. Let {qx(r) : x ∈ D} and {q¯x(r) : x ∈ D} be as shown in Theorem
4. Let Eq[d(r, f(x))], Eq¯[d(r, f(x))] be the expected distortion of {qx(r) : x ∈ D}
and {q¯x(r) : x ∈ D} at x, respectively, as defined in (40). Then, for any one
dataset x, if∑∞
i=0 exp(−i)
∑
r∈Rxi d(f(x), r)− exp(−L
x
q (r0))d(f(x), r0)∑∞
i=0 exp(−i)|Rxi | − exp(−Lxq (r0))
≤ d(f(x), r0)
1
,
(50)
there is Eq[d(r, f(x))] ≤ Eq¯[d(r, f(x))]. Otherwise, there is Eq[d(r, f(x))] ≥
Eq¯[d(r, f(x))].
Proof. This is an immediate corollary of Lemma 1 and Theorem 4. uunionsq
Theorem 5 shows that it is possible to improve the utility of the basic mech-
anism at x ∈ D by migrating some point r0 into the initial values set of x0 ∈ D
so long as the distance d(f(x), r0) is small enough, which is the theoretical foun-
dation of the claim that the δ-neighborhood mechanisms may have more better
utility than the purest mechanisms. However, Theorem 5 only shows the change
rule of utility when one x’s initial value set changes, the change rule of utility
when several or all x’s initial value sets change simultaneously is still unclear.
We will give some experimental evidence to the change rule in Section 5.3, whose
theoretical result needs further exploring.
Corollary 2. Each basic mechanism can be derived from an atomic mechanism
in the way of one dataset by another dataset as in Theorem 4.
Proof. Let {R¯x0 : x ∈ D} be the mechanism needing to be generated. First,
set the mechanism {qx(r) : x ∈ D} to be the atomic mechanism where each
Rx0 ⊆ R¯x0 for all x ∈ D. The claim can then be proved just by iteratively using
the result of Theorem 4. uunionsq
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5.2 The General Mechanisms
This section considers the general mechanisms where there exist some x ∈ D
such that RxIx 6= ∅ as defined in Definition 15. We first extend the results of
Theorem 4 to the general mechanisms.
Corollary 3. For the query function f , let x0, y0 be two datasets such that
f(x0) 6= r0 where r0 = f(y0). Let {qx(r) : x ∈ D}, {q¯x(r) : x ∈ D} be
two mechanisms of f and let {Rxi : i ∈ N¯, x ∈ D}, {R¯xi : i ∈ N¯, x ∈ D}
be their set sequences, respectively. Assume Rx0 = R¯x0 and RxIx = R¯xIx for
all x ∈ D \ {x0}. Assume Rx0i = R¯x0i for all i ∈ Ix0 ∪ {0} \ {i0} and as-
sume R¯x0i0 = Rx0i0 ∪ {r0}, where i0 ∈ Ix0 ∪ {0} and r0 /∈ Rx0i0 . Let y be one
dataset such that r 6= r0, where r = f(y). Then there are Lxq¯ (r) = Lxq (r) and
Lxq¯ (r0) = min
{dd¯(x0, x)e+ i0, Lxq (r0)}.
Proof. This is an immediate corollary of the construction rule (34) and Theorem
4. uunionsq
Note that the results of Theorem 5 are also suitable for the general mech-
anisms. Therefore, the construction of mechanisms of general mechanisms is
similar with the construction of the basic mechanisms in Section 5.1.
Corollary 4. Each general mechanism can be derived from a basic mechanism
in the way of one dataset by another dataset as in Corollary 3.
Proof. The proof is similar with the proof of Corollary 2. uunionsq
The Approximation Mechanisms We now discuss the approximation prob-
lem. Let f and g be two functions with the domain D and the codomain R. The
approximation problem is to substitute the study of differential privacy problem
of f for the study of differential privacy problem of the function g. One rea-
son to study the approximation problem is the need of low sensitivity Lipschitz
functions [57,32,44,58]. For example, if g is a low sensitivity Lipschitz function
and is an approximation of f , then the global sensitivity-based mechanisms,
such as Laplace mechanism, can be applied to g to obtain differentially private
approximation of f [58,59].
Another reason to study the approximation problem is for the situation where
the datasets have different occurring probabilities. In this situation, it is reason-
able to let those datasets with high occurring probabilities have relatively better
utilities than those without. In this setting, the utility of a mechanism is mea-
sured by the quantity P as shown in (5).
The key feature of the approximation problem is that when the dataset is x,
the query result is not f(x) or the points close to f(x) with respect to metric d,
which is formalized as the following definition.
Definition 19 (Approximation Mechanism). For a dataset x and a positive
number δx, set N
f(x)
δ = {r ∈ R : d(r, f(x)) ≤ δ}. Let {qx(r) : x ∈ D} be a
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mechanism for the query function f(x), x ∈ D. If there exists a dataset x ∈ D
such that N
f(x)
δx 6⊆ Rx0 for any positive number δx, we say that {qx(r) : x ∈ D}
is an approximation mechanism for f .
The aim of the approximation problems can be explained as substituting
the study of the approximation mechanisms of f for the study of the non-
approximation mechanisms of g.
Proposition 5. Let {Rx0 ,RxIx : x ∈ D} be one approximation mechanism of f .
Assume that, for each x ∈ D, there exist one f(x′) ∈ R and one positive number
δx
′
such that N
f(x′)
δx′
∈ Rx0 . Set g(x) = f(x′) for x ∈ D. Then {Rx0 ,RxIx : x ∈ D}
is one non-approximation mechanism of g.
Proof. The proof is immediate and therefore is omitted. uunionsq
5.3 Instance Analysis
In this section, we analyze some known mechanisms and give some experiments.
K-Norm Mechanism The K-norm mechanism [34,60] is one interesting mech-
anism. Set D = Rn,R = Rd and let F : D → R be a linear function. In [34,60],
the metric d¯ is defined as d¯(x, y) = ‖x− y‖1 for any two datasets x, y ∈ D, and
the metric d is defined as d(r, r′) = ‖r − r′‖2 for any two points r, r′ ∈ R. The
K-norm mechanism is defined as
px(r) =
1
α
exp(−‖F (x)− r‖K), (51)
where α is the normalizer, K = FBn1 = Ax1 −F (x) with Bn1 = N x−x being the
`1 unit ball.
Proposition 6. The K-norm mechanism is a basic mechanism.
Proof. By Definition 13,
Rxi ={r ∈ R : i ≤ ‖F (x)− r‖K < i+ 1}, (52)
={F (y) ∈ R : i ≤ ‖F (x− y)‖K < i+ 1} (53)
={F (y) ∈ R : i ≤ d¯(x, y) < i+ 1} (54)
for i ∈ N¯ and x ∈ D. Then
Axi ={F (y) ∈ R : d¯(x, y) < i+ 1} = ∪y∈D:d¯(x,y)≤iRy0. (55)
Therefore,
Rxi =Axi −Axi−1 = ∪y∈D:i−1<d¯(x,y)≤iRy0 −Axi−1, (56)
which implies that the K-norm mechanism is a basic mechanism. uunionsq
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Sensitivity-Based Mechanisms The sensitivity-based mechanisms [1,19,20]
are a kind of mechanisms which are both simple and efficient. They include
the global sensitivity-based mechanism [1], the local-sensitivity based mecha-
nism [20], the smooth sensitivity-based mechanism [19], and some variants of
constructing low-sensitivity Lipschitz functions [57,32,44,58].
Now, we analyze the global sensitivity mechanism. Let px(r) be the proba-
bility distribution of the equation (4) in [1]. Then
px(r) =
1
αx
exp
(
−d(r, f(x))
∆f

)
, (57)
where αx is the normalizer. For simplicity, let αx = αy for any two datases
x, y ∈ D. In the following, we prove that, in general, the global sensitivity-based
mechanisms are not basic mechanisms for the non-monotonic functions.
Proposition 7. For the query function f : D → R, assume there exist three
datasets x0, y0, z0 ∈ D such that f(z0) /∈ ∪y∈D:d¯(x0,y)≤i0Ry0, f(z0) ∈ {r ∈ R :
i0∆f ≤ d(f(x0), r) < (i0 + 1)∆f} and d¯(z0, x0) > i0, where i0 = dd¯(y0, x0)e.
Then the global sensitivity-based mechanism is not a basic mechanism.
Proof. Note that
Rx0i0 ={r ∈ R : i0∆f ≤ d(f(x0), r) < (i0 + 1)∆f}
={r ∈ R : i0∆f ≤ d(f(x0), r) < (i0 + 1)∆f} − {r ∈ R : d(f(x0), r) < i0∆f}
and Ax0i0 = {r ∈ R : d(f(x0), r) < (i0 + 1)∆f} for all i ∈ N¯. Furthermore,
∪y∈D:i0−1<d¯(x0,y)≤i0 Ry0 −Ax0i0−1
= ∪y∈D:i0−1<d¯(x0,y)≤i0 {r ∈ R : 0 ≤ d(f(y), r) < ∆f} − {r ∈ R : d(f(x0), r) < i0∆f}.
Then, by the assumptions, there is
f(z0) /∈ ∪y:i0−1<d¯(x0,y)≤i0Ry0 −Ax0i0−1 (58)
but f(z0) ∈ Rx0i0 . Therefore, the global sensitivity-based mechanism is not a
basic mechanism for f . uunionsq
Note that the assumptions about f in Proposition 7, in general, are hold-
ing when f is a non-monotonic function. Therefore, the global sensitivity-based
mechanism is not a basic mechanism for non-monotonic functions, in general.
Similarly, other sensitivity-based mechanisms, in general, are not basic mecha-
nisms for non-monotonic query functions. The above analysis also shows that the
sensitivity-based mechanisms are far less optimal respect to tradeoffs between
utility and privacy for non-monotonic query functions since, in general, the set
R˜xi is not empty set even when i is very large which will result in poor utility
by Theorem 5.
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Fig. 1: The comparison of the purest mechanism and the δ-neighborhood mech-
anism to the Ladder mechanism of their utilities for G7
Experiments to Subgraph Counting Function The subgraph counting is
one important problem in differential privacy [44,32,57,20]. We use the edge
differential privacy as in [20]. That is, two graphs are said to be neighbors if the
difference of their edges is 1. The query function f is to count the number of
triangles in a graph x ∈ D, where D = Gn denotes the set of all the graphs with
the number of nodes equals n such that any two graphs in Gn are not isomorphic.
Note that R = {f(x) : x ∈ D}, which is the set of possible number of triangles.
The utilities of mechanisms are measured by {P x : x ∈ D} defined in (4).
We compare the utilities of the purest mechanism or the δ-neighborhood
mechanism to the Ladder mechanisms in [20, Algorithm 1]. For the fairness of
comparison, we set the codomain of the counting function f in [20, Algorithm 1]
be R as above instead of Z. Furthermore, we substitute 2 for  in [20, Algorithm
1] which ensures that the Ladder mechanism is 2-differentially private as ours.
We evaluate the rate Rx = P x/P xL , where P
x denotes the utility of our mech-
anism at x and P xL denotes the corresponding utility of the Ladder mechanism
at x.
The details of the experiments are as follows. We set D be G7, where |D| =
1044 and |R| = 28. The results are shown in Fig. 1 where the point i in the
x-axis denotes a graph x, the point y in y-axis denotes the value  and the value
at the coordinate (i, y) is the value Ri when the input graph is i and  = y.
The upper figure in Fig. 1 shows the results when comparing the Ladder
mechanism to the purest mechanism. The below figure in Fig. 1 shows the re-
sults when comparing the Ladder mechanism to the δ-neighborhood mechanism,
where δ = 1 for all the graphs in {i : i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 100}}, and δ = 0 for other
graphs in D. From Fig. 1 we can see the purest mechanism is better than the
Ladder mechanism for most graphs when  ≥ 0.5. However, the δ-neighborhood
mechanism is worse than the Ladder mechanism for those graphs of δ = 1 and of
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most . We reason that this is due to the distance d(f(i), y) ≥ 1 for most y ∈ R,
which may result in that the inequality (50) does not hold.
Experiments to Linear Function The linear query function (Definition 9)
is a kind of well studied query functions in differential privacy [34,23,61,62,24].
Instead of treating batch linear queries, we treat a linear query.
We consider a special kind of the linear queries: the sum query. For the sum
query, one dataset can be denoted as its histogram x ∈ RN , with xi denoting
the number of elements in x of type i [23,3]. As discussed in Section 3.4 we use
the neighboring set Vf of f to denote the linear function f .
The details of the experiments are as follows. We consider four linear func-
tions (over four differnt dataset universes) respectively. They are V1 = [0, 1] ∪
[1000, 1001], V2 = [0, 100] ∪ [1000, 1001], V3 = [0, 500] ∪ [1000, 1001], V4 =
[0, 1001], where [a, b] denotes the corresponding interval in R. Note that the
first three sets are all concave set, which are different from the condition of the
standard K-norm mechanism [34] whose neighboring set K is convex. We com-
pare the purest mechanism and the δ-neighborhood mechanism to the Staircase
mechanism [61] for these queries. Note that, since a linear query is symmetric for
different datasets, the utilities P x, P y are the same for any two x, y ∈ D. There-
fore, we only need to evaluate the set sequences and P x for only one dataset.
Note that the same value δ is assigned to different datasets due to the above sym-
metric property. Before giving the detailed experiments, we first present some
theoretical results about linear queries.
Corollary 5. Let the mechanism {px(r) : x ∈ D} be -differentially private and
let its discretized mechanism {qx(r) : x ∈ D} be either a purest mechanism or a
δ-neighborhood mechanism. Then {qx(r) : x ∈ D} is -differentially private.
The above corollary is due to the symmetric property presented above which
leads to αx = αy for any two datasets x, y.
We now discuss the convergence of the set sequences.
Definition 20 (The convergence of set sequence). Let Vf be a linear query
function over R. The corresponding set sequence {Ri : i ∈ N¯} is said to be
convergent if there exist an and n such that Rn = an ± [0, ∆f ] and Rn+1 =
an ± [∆f, 2∆f ], where ∆f is the global sensitivity of Vf .
Proposition 8. Assume Vf = [0, a] ∪ [b, c] is a linear query function, where
0 < a < b < c. Then the sequence {Ri : i ∈ N¯} of f is convergent.
Proof. Note that the interval [b, c] will generate the interval [ib, ic] in Rxi . Setting
i ≥ ∆fc−b , we have [(i− 1)∆f, i∆f ] ⊆ [ib, ic]. This implies that [i∆f, (i+ 1)∆f ] ⊆Ri+1. Then it is convergent.
The utility of the mechanism M is measured by P x defined in (4), in which
f(x) = 0. We compare the purest mechanism or the δ-neighborhood mecha-
nism to the Staircase mechanism in [61, Algorithm 1]. We evaluate the rate
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Fig. 2: The utilities’ comparison of the purest mechanism and the δ-neighborhood
mechanism to the Staircase mechanism for the queries V1,V2,V3,V4 are shown
in (a), (b), (c), (d), respectively
R = P x/P xS , where P
x denotes the utility of the purest mechanism or the δ-
neighborhood mechanism and P xS denotes the utility of the Staircase mechanism.
The results are shown in Fig. 2 where the x-axis denotes the values of δ, the
y-axis denotes the value of  and the value at the coordinate (δ, ) is the value
R for the definite δ and . In Fig. 2, the results of the four queries V1,V2,V3,V4
are shown in (a), (b), (c), (d), respectively.
We now analyze the results in Fig. 2. The four queries V1,V2,V3,V4 have the
same global (and local) sensitivity ∆f = 1001. However, the volumes of their
neighboring set (Section 3.4) are different. Explicitly, Vol(V1) = 2,Vol(V2) =
101,Vol(V3) = 501 and Vol(V4) = 1001. Fig. 2 shows some interesting phe-
nomenon: The more larger of the value ∆f/Vol(Vf ), the more better of our
mechanisms compared to the Staircase mechanism when  ≥ 3 and 5 ≤ δ ≤ 50.
Furthermore, Fig. 2 shows that it is possible that the δ-neighborhood mechanism
can have more better utilities than the purest mechanism at every datasets.
6 Conclusion
By capturing the correlations among the differential privacy outputs M(x), x ∈
D, the differential privacy mechanism M can be represented just by some pa-
rameters, by which the universe of -differential privacy mechanisms of the query
function f is just a set of these parameters. These greatly simplify the construc-
tion of differential privacy mechanisms and then greatly simplify the optimal
mechanism problems. More importantly, these results are universal to every
query functions defined in Section 3.
The results of this paper provide a way to universally discuss the optimal
differentially private mechanisms defined in Section 4.3, at least theoretically.
Of course, we must acknowledge that the optimal mechanism problems are so
complicated that it is too early to say that our approaches can give the optimal
mechanism problems a relatively satisfied solution. Clearly, it is necessary to
give a detailed mathematical exploring of the optimal mechanisms for some
simple functions, such as the permutation functions in Definition 11 and the
linear functions in Definition 9, before discussing the optimal mechanisms of real
world problems, like those examples in Section 3.5. It seems that some results
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about operators in functional analysis, especially about the linear operators, will
inevitably be involved in the exploring. These should be urgent future works.
Furthermore, how to generalize the results of this paper to (, δ)-differential
privacy is another interesting work. Moreover, this paper only focuses on the
utility-privacy tradeoffs but seldom on the algorithm complexity. We hope, in
future, we can add the algorithm complexity consideration into our approaches.
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